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ABSTRACT 
A reform of tax administration in Indonesia has been carried out in several stages from 1983 
to 2009. However, the changes are limited to the tax system of the DGT, it being the tax govern-
ing body in Indonesia, which has still has not managed to meet the tax revenue target (reflected 
through a tax ratio). A lack of authority caused the DGT (DGT) to face some difficulties in 
reaching the target and demonstrating the expected performance. The goal of this paper is to 
stress the needs of institutional transformation in DGT. By using the Williamson Model, this 
study focuses on evaluating the DGT institutionally and creating an alternative institutional 
transformation of the DGT. The international and domestic results of ascertaining best 
practices conclude that the DGT needs to change gradually, not with a ‘big bang’, and by 
providing the more flexible authority by remaining in the structure of Traditional Department 
or Single Directorate in the Ministry of Finance (SDMOF) which would lead to an organization 
structure which is semi-autonomous or a Unified Semi-autonomous Body (USB) that covers all 
the systems of taxation such as service, assurance, law enforcement and supporting roles. 
Keywords:  tax governing body, Indonesian DGT (DGT), institutional transformation, 
williamson model 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Taxation Indonesian politics is closely re-
lated to the National Budget (APBN). According 
to data from the Fiscal Policy Office (December, 
2014) the value of the national budget increased 
significantly from early 2004, which only 
amounted to IDR 427.2 trillion, to IDR 1,639.4 
trillion in 2013 which means that there has been 
an almost four-fold rise in the last decade . In-
deed, in the 2014, the revised national budget 
draft document expenditure increased to IDR 
1,849.5 trillion which means total government 
expenditure accounted for between 16.2% and 
19.9% of the total Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) of Indonesia.  
National expenditures funded from revenue, 
as we1 see them originate from the contribution 
                                                            
1  It is acknowledged that this paper was modified from a 
research report written by Wihana Kirana Jaya, Anggi 
Rahajeng and Indra Bastian with the title ”Kajian 
of natural resources, the mining sector for exam-
ple, and the results of SOEs, are still relatively 
small and international resources undeniably 
could bring some other problems. Inevitably In-
donesia is relatively dependent on tax revenues. 
When viewed from the ratio of tax revenues to 
GDP (tax ratio) reached approximately 12%. In 
general trend Indonesian tax ratio is also rela-
tively low compared to other countries of the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), non-OECD, emerging 
markets even in other ASEAN countries, namely 
13.3%, while the OECD countries by 34% and 
non-OECD at 26.8% (OECD, 2013). This figure 
is relatively stagnant for ten years so as to esti-
mate the ratio of Indonesian tax until 2018 also 
remains relatively low at about 12.12% with a 
relatively high ratio gap of about 7.43%.  
                                                                                         
Kelembagaan Direktorat Jenderal Pajak, 2015” on which 
collaborated with AIPEQ and the Indonesian Directorate 
General of Taxes 
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In this study, data triangulation has been col-
lected as material for analysis: 
1. Focus Group Discussions (FGD) which were 
held on: 
a. October 2, 2014 in Solo with staff from 
the Indonesian DGT 
b. October 8, 2014 in Jakarta with staff from 
the Indonesian DGT, INTRAC (PPATK), 
State Audit Agency (BPK), the Police, 
Judiciary, and Corruption Eradication 
Commission (KPK), Special Task Force 
Implementation of Upstream Oil and Gas 
(Satuan Kerja Khusus Pelaksana Kegiatan 
Usaha Hulu Minyak dan Gas Bumi/SKK 
Migas), Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(Lembaga Penjamin Simpanan/LPS) 
c. October 15, 2014 in Jakarta with partici-
pants including Tax Consultants, 
INTRAC (PPATK), Corruption Eradica-
tion Commission (KPK), Bank Indonesia 
(Central Bank), Ministry of Finance 
d. October 16, 2014 in Jakarta with partici-
pants including academics, business asso-
ciation (APINDO), PBNU, Ernst &Young, 
Australian Treasury, ADB, World Bank, 
IMF, AIPEG, LAN 
2. Literature Study. 
3. In-depth Interview with staff from the Indo-
nesian DGT  
EVALUATION ON THE EXISTING 
CONDITION OF THE DGT 
The first objective of the study is to evaluate 
the current condition of the DGT (DGT) as the 
tax management body in Indonesia. The perfor-
mance of the DGT in terms of the resulting state 
revenues over the last ten years shows that it is 
still very buoyant, less elastic, with stagnant 
yields, and stable in terms of the increase of 
GDP. Now, the performance of DGT can be 
seen in the low of tax ratio, the taxpayers’ for-
mal compliance level in Indonesia, which is also 
still low with a compliance rate of 60.8% as op-
posed to the target of 65% in 2013, the low rate 
of audit coverage which was only 0.25% in 
2013. These conditions are also exacerbated by 
an imbalance in the ratio of the number of 
inspectors and Account Representatives (AR) to 
taxpayers i.e. 1:2,558 in 2013 (DJP, 2014). It 
concluded that the performance of the DGT has 
has not been optimal. The lack of authority pos-
sessed by the DGT is believed to be the main 
cause of its low effectiveness and efficiency. As 
a governing tax body, the Directorate only has 
some limited authority with regard to the tax 
system. It has no authority to regulate its own 
organization, human resources, and its own 
budget. The DGT needs authority if it is to im-
prove the quality of governance and the integrity 
of tax administration. 
By looking at the current condition of the 
DGT, which is not working optimally, caused by 
its lack of authority, a restructuring of its gover-
nance and institutional transformation is urgently 
needed. 
The institutional transformation, according 
to international benchmarking for best practices 
in the transformation of public institutions, the 
DGT is set at least one for each of the following 
categories: 
1. SDMOF: Single Directorate in the Ministry 
of Finance. 
2. MDMOF: Multiple Directorates in the Minis-
try of Finance. 
3. USB: Unified Semi-autonomous Body. 
4. USBB: Unified Semi-autonomous Body with 
Board.  
Indonesia has adopted a self-assessment tax 
under Law No.28 2007 on General Provisions 
and Tax Procedures by the Directorate General 
of Taxes as the agency designated to administer 
tax under the Ministry of Finance. The DGT 
manages central government taxes: Value Added 
Tax (VAT) based on Law 42/2009, the Income 
Tax based on Law 36/2008 and the Land and 
Building Tax especially for plantations, forestry 
and mining (Law 2/1994 and Law20/2000). Ac-
cording to Presidential Decree 24/2010, the DGT 
duties are to formulate and implement taxation 
policies, to establish norms, standards, proce-
dures, criteria (NSPK), to provide technical 
guidance and evaluation in the field of taxation, 
and the administration of the DGT. 
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In performing these duties, the DGT has the 
following functions: 
1. Policy formulation in the field of taxation. 
2. Implementation of policies in the field of 
taxation. 
3. Preparation of norms, standards, procedures, 
and criteria in the field of taxation. 
4. Providing technical guidance and evaluation 
in the field of taxation. 
5. Implement the administration of the DGT. 
Broadly speaking, the main function of the 
DGT is the tax administration, including man-
agement and has major business processes in the 
field of tax services to the taxpayer and tax 
monitoring and enforcement so, by the institu-
tional nature of the organization, the DGT has 
specific duties that are rigid and unique com-
pared to other public organizations.  
Based on the duties and functions of the 
DGT, it is expected to be a tool for the state (the 
executive, legislative and judicial branches) to 
collect revenue from the public through taxation 
to finance the administration of the state. By way 
of evaluation, has the DGT already performed its 
basic tasks and functions optimally? It can be 
seen from some of the following issues: 
1. The contribution of tax revenues in the state 
budget, in 2014 approximately 60% to 70% 
has not been reached. A short fall occured on 
state income tax (Bisnis Indonesia, October 
2014). 
2. A potential utilization. The population of 
Indonesia is currently about 253 million 
people and according to data from the Central 
Bureau of Statistics (Badan Pusat Statis-
tik/BPS) those with the potential to pay taxes 
(taxpayers) number approximately 110 mil-
lion people while the taxpayer data held by 
the DGT is about 26 million. This means 
there are 84million potential taxpayers who 
have not been optimized (Kismantoro, 2014). 
If the DGT is to perform its functions opti-
mally, it needs to be supported by several as-
pects such as human resources, budget and orga-
nizational structure. 
INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE 
DGT WITH BEST PRACTICES 
The institutional evaluation of the Directo-
rate General of Taxes is conducted using two 
approaches. First, by comparing the best practice 
with tax authority institutions/the state revenue 
in selected foreign countries and, second, the 
comparing best practice with the selected 
governmental institutions in Indonesia such as 
Bank Indonesia (Central Bank), KPK (Corrup-
tion Eradication Commission), PPATK (Indone-
sian Financial Transaction Reports and Analysis 
Center/INTRAC), Financial Services Authority 
(Otoritas Jasa Keuangan/OJK), Special Task 
Force for the Implementation of Upstream Oil 
and Gas (Satuan Kerja Khusus Pelaksana Kegia-
tan Usaha Hulu Minyak dan Gas Bumi/SKK Mi-
gas), Deposit Insurance Corporation (Lembaga 
Penjamin Simpanan/LPS) etc. as domestic best 
practices. 
There is a lot of literature which discusses 
the institutional form of tax authorities that are 
semi-autonomous revenue authorities (SARAs) 
in various countries such as New Zealand, 
Singapore and others in Africa and Latin Ameri-
ca (Taliercio, 2003). The application of SARAs 
is not the only rapid and appropriate way for 
developing countries. The tax ratio and low 
income, corruption, less efficient administration, 
that are seen in the Ministry of Finance, along 
with tax evasion, do not automatically and 
immediately become the reason why such coun-
tries form a tax authority institution by applying 
SARAs. It is true but in some conditions, not all 
of these require this way of forming an institu-
tion. If SARAs is formed, then it needs to pre-
pare infrastructure/facilities which can anticipate 
institutional changes, and successful perfor-
mance in the long-term that depends on the 
power and quality of SARAs leadership, politi-
cal will and ongoing support from government 
and the private sector (Mann, 2004). 
A state revenue agency (Revenue Authority 
–RA) outside the Ministry of Finance is a solu-
tion to overcome the problems of low perfor-
mance regarding collection of state revenue, the 
level of compliance, ineffective staff and corrup-
tion, so that it will be more accountable (Crandal 
2014 
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In terms of human resource management, the 
DGT does not have any authority including hir-
ing or dismissing of employees, and arranging 
its employees’ salaries, so it is difficult to ar-
range both incentives and non incentives, and 
carrying out renumeration, since all are centra-
lized in the Ministry of Finance and bound by 
regulations pertaining to civil servants. Mean-
while, it shows that some countries with a semi-
autonomous system (with or without board) tend 
to have the high degree of autonomy. 
In general, the performance of the authority 
of tax revenues increased after becoming a semi-
autonomous body, although the experience of 
various countries also shows that the formation 
of a semi-autonomous body is not necessarily a 
"panacea" for improving/optimizing revenue. 
Mann (2004) asserted that the establishment 
of the semi-autonomy of the state revenue 
agency (SARA) is not a "panacea" to improve 
collection and reduce the problem of ineffi-
ciency in tax administration, as SARA only pro-
vides a platform so that positive reform can 
occur, but SARA can also be a catalyst and 
facilitate reform, but the formation of SARA is 
only necessary and not sufficient in and of itself 
to lead to reform. 
This means that the legal and institutional 
reforms that create SARA are not complete un-
less they accompanied by reforms to the whole 
process and all procedures throughout the entire 
tax collecting agency. Inefficiencies can con-
tinue to run without a total overhaul of the inter-
nal processes and procedures, and strengthening 
of the regulatory framework and accountability 
that connects SARA with other public sector 
institutions and the private sector (taxpayers). 
Internal conflict or friction can occur between 
the Ministry of Finance (and ministers) and 
SARA and/or between the board and the director 
of SARA. In addition, corruption occurs fre-
quently, and this is a consequence of the slow 
pace of enforcement and unassertive sanctions. 
(Terkper in Mann, 2004). 
In Indonesia, some agencies/government or-
ganizations are independent entities so they can 
be used as a reference for the analysis of the 
DGT reforms such as the Corruption Eradication 
Commission (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi/ 
KPK), Financial Services Authority (Otoritas 
Jasa Keuangan/OJK), Special Task Force for the 
Implementation of Upstream Oil and Gas 
(Satuan Kerja Khusus Pelaksana Kegiatan Usaha 
Hulu Minyak dan Gas Bumi/SKK Migas), Depo-
sit Insurance Corporation (Lembaga Penjamin 
Simpanan/LPS) and Bank Indonesia (BI).  
Accroding to Indonesian regulations, all 
agencies/entities have the authority to regulate 
human resources including recruitment, renume-
ration, promotion and dismissal of an employee 
at a certain level though to be appointed by the 
President with the approval of Parliament 
BIinstance, the Financial Services Authority and 
the Corruption Eradication Commission. Corrup-
tion Eradication Commission (KPK) employees 
are permanent employees and civil servants 
though the Commission was given special au-
thority to set independently such as the eradica-
tion of corruption involving many elements such 
as the law and enforcement investigators and 
prosecutors from the police and the prosecutor 
can be appointed by the Commission. The re-
cruitment process of the Corruption Eradication 
Commission’s commissioners/staff is no longer 
based on political reasons as well as proximity to 
the country's leaders (free from the political 
elite). While the DGT as an institution specializ-
ing in tax under the Ministry of Finance does not 
have the authority to regulate human resources 
and is bound by civil service rules whereas the 
number of DGT employees comprise nearly 
50% of the total employees of the Ministry of 
Finance and has a lot of challenges in the man-
agement of tax administration so that dynamic 
requires competent, professional and flexible 
human resources. The Head of DGT could be 
proposed by the Ministry of Finance by referring 
to the regulations of the State Personnel Board 
(Badan Kepegawaian Negara/BKN), and the 
Ministry of Administrative Reform. 
The human resources in the Financial Ser-
vices Authority and Corruption Eradication 
Commission consist of some elements, such as 
civil servants (Pegawai Negeri Sipil/PNS), po-
lice, attorneys (KPK). The Financial Services 
Authority consists of the Capital Market Super-
2014 Jaya, et.al. 265 
 
visory Agency (Badan Pengawas Pasar Modal/ 
Bapepam), Bank Indonesia (BI), and the Minis-
try of Finance, so it has its own challenges in 
terms of acculturation, the cultural blending, or 
equalizing the different working cultures which 
takes some time. The DGT tends to have a 
relatively low risk since it consists only of one 
main element as in Bank Indonesia that only 
involves the personnel of Bank Indonesia which 
has been successful. The institutional trans-
formation of the DGT has to get some support 
from other agencies such as the Corruption Era-
dication Commission especially in terms of the 
supervision and enforcement. 
In terms of budgeting, an independent gov-
ernment institution (Ministry of Non-Govern-
ment Institutions) is a structural organization 
under the president and is responsible to the 
president directly. The Corruption Eradication 
Commission and Bank Indonesia can determine 
their own budget including setting the opera-
tional costs, salaries, remuneration, and incen-
tives, by referring to the standard costs assigned 
by the Ministry of Finance as a state financial 
regulatory agency and are obliged to submit a 
financial report to the Audit Board in order to 
maintain the accountability and transparency of 
the budget. Those institutions also have the au-
thority to form their own units according to their 
needs since those independent institutions are 
formed based on specific and rigid duties and 
functions. The discretion regarding three of these 
powers is not owned by the DGT as a single 
directorate under the Ministry of Finance. 
INSTITUTIONAL TRANSFORMATION 
ANALYSIS OF THE DGT  
1.  Culture, Mindset, Image and Public Trust 
Public trust is an important issue to be consi-
dered in the institutional transformation of the 
DGT whose staff are often corrupt thus it tends 
to have a negative image in the eyes of society 
especially taxpayers. This should be changed by 
means of building good organizational culture 
and behavior at the DGT. According to its 2012 
annual report, the cultural values of the DGT 
organization that have been built are: integrity, 
professionalism, synergy, services and perfec-
tion. It is these values that will support the 
achievement of the vision of the DGT to be a 
government institution that organizes a modern 
tax administration system which is effective, 
efficient, and trusted with such high integrity 
and professionalism.  
The DGT, as the authority organizing the in-
come of the state from tax collection, needs to be 
directed into being a profit center instead of a 
cost center. The Williamson Model mentions 
that the informal instutitution, custom, traditions 
and norms are important things that need to be 
reformed at the earlier stages of institutional 
reform, so the culture of the DGT needs to be led 
towards proactive, innovative, and aggressive 
action in all elements in the DGT both for the 
leaders and officials at central and local levels. 
The change in culture that is pro client becomes 
the new spirit for the business process of the 
DGT so it can optimize the state’s tax revenue.  
The honesty and trust values are important 
for the DGT in order to build up public trust. 
The public service announcements, slogans and 
campaign conducted by the DGT will not be ef-
fective if the behavior of the tax officers does 
not reflect the values of honesty and trustworthi-
ness. Tax benefit utilization transparency is 
needed for the public so they will believe that 
the taxes they have paid are put to good use. The 
value of mutual respect positions the taxpayer as 
a partner instead of taxable object and maintains 
the equity and fairness. A change in the mindset 
of the tax officers towards the taxpayers could 
change the public/taxpayers’ mindset regarding 
the DGT which has been marred by unscrupul-
ous behavior by DGT staff, so the negative 
image of DGT, which has been one of debt-
collector and corruptor could be converted into a 
more positive image. The mindsets of the tax 
officers and taxpayers, along with the strong lea-
dership, are needed in the institutional transfor-
mation of the DGT.  
2.   Institutional Arrangements for Tax 
Administration 
The DGT’s bureaucratic reforms have been 
conducted since 2002 and are often referred to as 
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the modernization of tax administration involv-
ing organizational reforms, information and 
technology-based business process development, 
and the implementation of good governance sup-
ported by human resource management which is 
based on the expertise, competencies and skills 
needed to optimize the state revenue. Some 
countries have also reformed their taxation sys-
tem, for example in the European Community 
through the EC’s fiscal blueprints to reform the 
state revenue agencies in organizational struc-
ture, human resource management along with 
the behavior, system and function of the tax ad-
ministration agency, so that they can manage the 
tax in an effective and efficient way. This bu-
reaucratic reform is aimed at assuring the state 
revenue agency has enough authority to design 
the organizational structure, set clear objectives, 
vision and mission, and has flexibility to carry 
out its duties and functions effectively and effi-
ciently, supported by adequate resources and a 
strong legal framework in order to provide the 
high quality services and intensive supervision 
for the taxpayers. 
According to the Williamson Model, DGT 
needs to get Environment Rights (institutional 
environment) including formal rules-of-the-
game. Thus, institutional reform of the DGT 
needs to obtain the various external support from 
examples of good relationships with the Ministry 
of Finance, strong corporation with other public 
institutions in the executive, legislative and 
judicative, especially in sharing the data, investi-
gation and enforcement. Beside these, the insti-
tutional reforms of the DGT need a strong and 
continuous commitment especially in terms of 
services and enforcement, so it is important that 
the application of better good governance is 
carried out. 
The DGT does not have any authority in de-
termining the internal structure design, budget 
allocation, hiring/firing of staff, and determining 
the salary rates since the DGT is under the 
Ministry of Finance along with other directorates 
general and the tax officers are subject to the 
regulations of the State Treasury Agency and 
Ministry of Administrative Reform (single direc-
torate in Ministry of Finance model-SDMOF). In 
some countries, the state revenue is derived from 
duties and taxes which belong to one institution 
of state revenue (Austria, Netherlands, Greece, 
Columbia and South Africa). Meanwhile, in 
Indonesia, the tax is under the DGT and duties 
are authorized by Directorate General of Cus-
toms and Excise.  
3.   Organizational Structure Reformation of 
DGT 
The organizational structure of the DGT is 
under the Ministry of Finance, so the internal 
design of its organization also follows the Minis-
try of Finance including the supporting functions 
such as budgeting, human resource management 
and information technology as with other direc-
torates general under the Ministry of Finance. 
The DGT, as the implementation unit for fiscal 
policy in terms of Indonesian taxation, has con-
ducted some transformation of organizational 
structure.  
Bureaucratic reforms of the DGT, in terms of 
organizational restructuring, are aimed at over-
coming the organizational issues at the opera-
tional level (vertical unit) such as the redun-
dancy between control and inspection, the 
absence of a one-stop service, the structure that 
has not been fully supported in terms of good 
governance application, service standards that 
have not been maintained at a high level. Then 
there is a functional transition of fiscal policy 
from the DGT to the Fiscal Policy Office under 
the Ministry of Finance, so the tax target is de-
termined by the Fiscal Policy Office as the ad-
ministrator of state finance, while the DGT is a 
policy implementation unit in taxation. 
Other public institutions, such as the Corrup-
tion Eradication Commission, support the insti-
tutional transformation of the DGT including the 
change of the organization’s form by consider-
ing that the change should be accompanied by 
improved implementation of good corporate 
governance and the existence of checks and bal-
ances procedures to oversee the transformation 
process. 
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4.   Human Resource Management and Tax 
Administration 
Human resources are one of the main keys to 
the success of tax administration, so strategy is 
needed to manage it. The DGT does not have the 
authority to manage human resources. Therefore, 
the DGT does not have formal strategic planning 
related to human resource management. Aspects 
of human resource management strategies in-
clude recruitment, enhancement of staff skills, 
leadership and talent management, staff satisfac-
tion and achievement, diversity, demographic 
profiles of staff, remuneration and bonuses, set-
ting the number of staff and job rotation. The 
DGT has an employee performance appraisal 
system, planned targets to increase staff capacity 
and to conduct training, and to provide rewards 
beyond those predetermined by the Ministry of 
Finance. However, DGT has no mechanism for 
periodical staff satisfaction surveys and should 
not do their own recruitment. Though, by its na-
ture, it requires staff/employees who have com-
petency/skills/specific expertise in the field of 
taxation that can not be obtained in a short time 
even through training. 
DGT is also lack of flexibility in terms of 
remuneration and salaries as shall be subject to 
Apparatus State Civil Law, State Personnel 
Board regulation and Ministry of Administrative 
Reform since all of the employees belong to the 
civil servants (PNS). In 2011, the expenditures 
on wages/salaries of DGT employees compared 
to the total expenditure/expense for tax admi-
nistration is relatively low (50.5%) compared to 
other countries like Malaysia (82.4%) and 
Singapore (55.3%). Currently, in 2014 many 
echelon 3 in DGT that are not filled as a result of 
the long bureaucratic process to propose the 
echelon 3. Management of human resources to 
face the issue of incentives, remuneration and 
employee of living cost disparities of the DGT 
employees who work in locations with a high 
cost of living index tends todemotivate the 
workandbea disincentive for the DGT employees 
5.   Monitoring and Law Enforcement on 
Taxes 
The DGT needs to listen to the expectations, 
desires, hopes, grievances, complaints of 
taxpayers. The United States, for example, esta-
blished a tax ombudsman agency (the National 
Taxpayer Advocate Service-TAS), as did 
Canada (The Office of Taxpayer's Ombudsman-
TO), to handle complaints, to guarantee the 
rights and obligations and to maintain a good 
relationships between the taxpayer and the tax 
authorities. The monitoring system is not only 
directed to the taxpayer but also monitoring to 
the quality of performance and integrity of the 
DGT personnel. In supervision and enforcement, 
taxpayers need to be viewed as a partner and 
receive treatment based on the principles of 
justice where there is no difference in treatment 
between taxpayers and there are no exceptions.  
Indonesia established a special ombudsman 
institution in taxation field in order to in crease 
the tax payer compliance through Law on 
General Provisions and Tax Procedures is 
formed by the Supervisory Committee on 
Taxation (Regulation of Finance Minister No. 
54/PMK.09/2008). Non-structural committee is 
tasked with and responsible to the Minister of 
Finance, supervise the implementation of DGT 
task includes observation, information gathering, 
and receipt of public complaints. To address the 
issue of public trust, equity and fairness for the 
taxpayer, image and branding of DGT’s Offi-
cers, and DGT’s accountability are necessary to 
strengthen the role of the Supervisory Commit-
tee on Taxation as an internal supervisor and 
ombudsman institutions through institutional 
strengthening supported by adequate regulation. 
6.  Tax Compliance 
Tax compliance, in terms of time, starts from 
the enrollment in the tax system, the return of 
forms, tax calculation, tax reporting and pay-
ment of taxes.  
The success of the self assessment tax sys-
tem, such as the one in Indonesia, is largely 
determined by the taxpayer’s voluntary com-
pliance and supervision of the law enforcement 
apparatus of tax (enforcement) is indispensable. 
Tax compliance can be optimal if the magnitude 
and the mechanism of tax payment are not 
burdensome to the taxpayers, and the DGT may 
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implement some solutions to these issues by 
reducing the tax rate and and subsequently it 
could be integrated with the multiple social data 
such as e-ID (Identity Card) and e-TIN (Tax-
payer Identification Number). Moreover, tax-
payers will dutifully pay taxes if there is the ease 
of paying taxes ranging from registration to the 
reporting so IT becomes extremely important, 
and filing tax return is not complicated.  
7.   Coordination of Data Sharing With Public 
Institution 
The major issue currently at the DGT is the 
lack of coordination involving various public 
institutions such as in Ministry of Law and Hu-
man Rights and the Center for Financial Trans-
action Reports and Analysis. This coordination 
is important for the DGT to optimize state reve-
nue and to prevent conflicts with other law en-
forcement agencies for example the National 
Police and the Attorney.  
In fact, the coordination of the DGT with 
other public institutions has been arranged with 
Law 16/2009 on General Provisions and Tax 
Procedures. Coordination between the DGT as 
the tax authorities with other public institutions, 
including banks and Bank Indonesia, is provided 
for in Article 34. 
Regulation of this data sharing coordination 
especially emphasized by Article 35A which 
states that every government institution, agency, 
association, and other party, is obliged to pro-
vide data and information related to taxation to 
the DGT which is regulated by Government 
Regulations. In order to conduct oversight, the 
implementation of the compliance with tax obli-
gations as a consequence of the application of 
self-assessment system, the data and information 
related to taxation that come from government 
agencies, institutions, associations, and the other 
parties are required by the DGT. Strengthened 
by Government Regulation 31/2012 on Data 
Provision and Collection Related to Taxation, 
Article 2, government institutions, agencies, 
associations, and other parties are obliged to pro-
vide data and information to the DGT. 
However, the current data access and mi-
nimal taxation information, for example the 
access to the data bank can only be made for a 
particular case in terms of criminal investiga-
tions in the taxation field and the tax collection 
framework. The issue of coordination with other 
public institutions is also a problem because of 
differences in job level, thereby to strengthen the 
institution by providing the level of tax positions 
with other strategic institutions that are indis-
pensable. The DGT needs to use a multiple ap-
proach on law enforcement together with with 
other public agencies, especially the Police, 
Judiciary, INTRAC (PPATK), Corruption Eradi-
cation Commission (KPK) and related agencies 
under the coordination of law enforcement under 
the same roof to overcome the issues of coor-
dination and data sharing. 
8. The Use of Electronic Services in Tax 
Administration 
Today, the use of IT for the user tax in 
Indonesia is limited only to the access to legal 
databases and the DGT web site. The results of 
the study conducted by the Corruption Eradica-
tion Commission showed that the DGT still 
needs to improve its tax database which is still 
not reliable. Until now, the database is not inte-
grated and there is duplication of data. There-
fore, the DGT will need to develop a specific 
roadmap to build a database that is fundamental 
to the potential exploration and oversight of tax-
payer compliance. 
Information technology is an essential ele-
ment that must be corrected by the DGT. Busi-
ness processes supported by optimal use of 
information technology are needed, especially in 
the process of profiling and taxpayer oversight. 
The issue of data access for tax and taxpayers 
strongly associated with the availability of 
resources and DGT competency, especially 
account representatives (AR) which exist in all 
regions in Indonesia. This issue is also related to 
the issue of flexibility in the management of 
human resources. 
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ALTERNATIVE TRANSFORMATION 
FRAMEWORKS OF DGT 
The institutional transformation of the tax 
administration are implemented gradually, while 
the stages in the transformation are described 
below: 
1.  Phase 1: 100 Days to 6 Months 
Phase 1 is for the increasing and optimizing 
of the authority of the DGT, though it is still a 
single Directorate in the Ministry of Finance 
(MOF). The DGT will be given additional au-
thority, flexibility in certain aspects in accor-
dance with international best practice (nine au-
thority-see Table 1), among others, personnel 
(human resource management, remuneration/ 
incentives for performance achievements), bud-
get (the amount, allocation and reallocation of 
the budget) and determine the design of the 
internal structure with the approval and coor-
dination of the Ministry of Finance. The autho-
rization can be given through legislation, such as 
government regulations, or ministerial regula-
tions. In order to guarantee the implementation 
of subsequent phases require the government's 
commitment which is expressed in laws or a 
roadmap document.  
Strengthening of image, branding, public 
trust in the DGT as the tax authorities are 
accountable, transparent, clean and trustworthy. 
All these can be achieved by changing the mind-
set of the DGT officers and the public in their 
views of the tax. The DGT should be able to 
transform into a state institution that is more 
likely to profit centers and more looking at the 
taxpayer as a partner of the state in collecting tax 
revenue on the basis of equality and fairness. 
The DGT should be able to transform the whole 
mind set of employees from central to local tax 
officials to be more proactive, aggressive, innov-
tive, market driven and client-oriented. 
In this stage, the DGT also needs to streng-
then the infrastructure, including the use of IT-
based data for secure tax revenue in 2015. 
2.  Phase 2: Year 1 to Year 2 
Phase2 is where the DGT, with the addition 
of new authority but still under the Ministry of 
Finance, optimizes and strengthens cooperation 
with taxpayers and another institutions such as 
INTRAC (PPATK), the Police, Judiciary, and 
the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK). 
This includes carrying out various kinds of coop-
eration to learn and adopt from the success of tax 
authority institutions in other countries. In this 
stage, the DGT strengthens external factors and 
prepares, strengthens the support of both the 
environment of other public institutions such as 
INTRAC (PPATK), State Audit Agency (BPK), 
the Police, Judiciary, and the Corruption Eradi-
cation Commission (KPK), prosecutors, and 
even Parliament (executive, legislative and 
judicial). It is hoped that the lessons learned by 
the DGT can strengthen preparations to become 
a more independent institution. 
3.  Phase 3: Year 2 to Year 5 (Mid Term) 
In this phase, the DGT is prepared to trans-
form into a Unified Semi-Autonomous Body 
after all the components have been prepared for 
the process of transformation of the DGT as a 
regulatory, business process (good tax gover-
nance), organization (after a benchmarking study 
and collaboration with overseas and domestic 
institutions). Establishing this USB requires a 
legal basis to strengthen the position of the tax 
authority as an independent institution in accor-
dance with laws or government regulations that 
regulate, among others, organization, business 
processes, authority, leadership, relationships 
between institutions, and transitional provisions. 
4.   Phase 4: Year 5 and the Following Years 
(Long Term) 
In this phase, if necessary, the tax adminis-
tration is managed with the involvement of vari-
ous stakeholders including the private sector in 
the form of an oversight board and this can be 
done with a USB where conditions are optimal 
and mature. 
CONCLUSIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
The performance of the DGT in terms of the 
resulting state revenues over the last ten years 
shows that it is still very buoyant, less elastic, 
270 Journal of Indonesian Economy and Business September 
 
with stagnant yields, and stable in terms of the 
increase of GDP. Now, the performance of DGT 
can be seen in the low of tax ratio, the low level 
of mandatory formal compliance, the low tax 
coverage ratio, and the low audit coverage ratio. 
The DGT faces institutional problems caused by 
overlapping and multiple interpretations related 
to the administration of the tax laws, tax law en-
forcement, data sharing and coordination be-
tween the DGT and other public institutions.  
The DGT management performance is not 
optimal, effective or efficient, so what is needed 
is a road map of institutional change for the 
DGT. The international and domestic results of 
ascertaining best practices conclude that the 
DGT needs to change gradually, not with a ‘big 
bang’, and by providing the more flexible au-
thority by remaining in the structure of Tradi-
tional Department or Single Directorate in the 
Ministry of Finance (SDMOF) which would lead 
to an organization structure which is semi-auto-
nomous or a Unified Semi-autonomous Body 
(USB) that covers all the systems of taxation 
such as service, assurance, law enforcement and 
supporting roles. 
The recommendations in the short-term fo-
cus on securing tax revenue in 2015 with the 
internal consolidation of the DGT to establish a 
good security team for revenue at the national 
level, regional level and the operational level, 
the consolidation of human resources, counsel-
ing extra effort and disbursement of tax recei-
vables.  
In order to broaden the tax base and capture 
the data about underreported tax, what is needed 
is external cooperation to optimize the imple-
mentation of Government Regulation No.31/ 
2012 as the mandate of Section 35A of the KUP 
Act and activate the MOU with PPATK, Central 
Bank, OJK, and other technical ministries and 
internal cooperation in the Ministry of Finance. 
In addition, it is necessary to establish a team 
to prepare the institutional reformation of the 
DGT under the Ministry of Finance to be a Uni-
fied State Revenue Agency and Semi-autonom-
ous Body. The team will consist of teams for law 
and legislation, institutional teams (duties, the 
design of the internal structure, and SOP) and 
also operational support teams such as human 
resources, budget, infrastructure, and informa-
tion technology. The Government through the 
Ministry of Finance is also expected to be active 
in supporting this process. 
Legally, in order to realize the DGT’s flex-
ibility in managing human resources, it can be 
done in two ways, namely discretionary and 
attributive. In the short term, the government can 
draw up regulations that are discretionary, the 
President may delegate the development of hu-
man resources, including recruitment, appoint-
ment, rotation/transfer of employees to the DGT 
as the competent authority in accordance with 
Article 54 paragraph(1) of Law 5/2014. Then for 
the next step, compile attributive laws that give 
authority to the DGT to organize human re-
source management in coordination with State 
Personnel Board (Badan Kepegawaian Negara/ 
BKN), and the Ministry of Administrative 
Reform. 
The problem of the limited authority of the 
DGT in terms of the budget can be overcome by 
providing the DGT with the flexibility to have a 
separate budget with and work plan from the 
budget of the Ministry of Finance. Under Gov-
ernment Regulation 90/2010, Article 1 para-
graph 2, the term "other agency budget users" is 
stated and then the new DGT will be a budget 
user as stipulated in Law 17/2003 which is not 
combined with the budget of the Ministry of 
Finance, but the unit will remain under the coor-
dination of the Ministry of Finance in terms of 
fiscal management in accordance with Law 
17/2003 Article 6 paragraph (2) letter a. 
The DGT needs to be evaluated continuously 
to support changes in the structure and institu-
tional authority over the alignment of vision, 
mission, strategies, expected outcomes, mission-
driven work and inovation, impact and engage-
ment to make continuous improvement reviews 
(CIR) each month. 
In the subsequent annual programme, the 
priority is to improve the public trust through 
good governance. This needs to be done through 
the development of organizational culture and 
behavior of all the componets of the DGT based 
on the values of integrity, professionalism, 
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synergy, service and excellence, as well as the 
implementation of the code of ethics. In addi-
tion, the leadership selection process of the DGT 
needs to be done openly and using a merit-based 
system like the KPK leadership selection 
process, the placement of the Commission offi-
cials, BPK and PPATK, as well as the transpa-
rency of disclosure of assets and wealth of pub-
lic officials in the DGT through LHKPN deli-
very to the public. 
The DGT needs to optimize the program of 
good governance through examination-based 
risk analysis and coordination with the relevant 
third parties sharing the data, investigation and 
collection of taxes as mandated by the KUP Act 
in optimizing revenues such as cooperation with 
PPATK, BPK, the Police, and KPK. 
It is necessary to formulate a special regula-
tion on coordination in the field of tax enforce-
ment to strengthen enforcement and improve 
taxpayer compliance. The process of institu-
tional change of DGT from the traditional de-
partment towards a Unified Semi-autonomous 
Body as a separate agency with the Ministry of 
Finance requires a commitment by the govern-
ment, such as happened in Japan, Mongolia and 
Vietnam. This commitment is needed to ensure 
that the stages of institutional change can be rea-
lized and improve the performance of taxation in 
Indonesia. 
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